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Abstract 
Despite media images to the contrary, cardiopulmonary resuscitation in emergency 
departments is often unsuccessful. The purpose of this ethnographic study was to explore 
how health care professionals working in two emergency departments in the UK, make 
decisions to commence, continue or stop resuscitation. Data collection involved participant 
observation of resuscitation attempts and in-depth interviews with nurses, medical staff and 
paramedics who had taken part in the attempts. Detailed case examples were constructed 
for comparative analysis. Findings show that emergency department staff use experience 
and acquired tacit knowledge to construct a typology of cardiac arrest categories that help 
them navigate decision making. Categorisation is based on `less is more’ heuristics which 
combine explicit and tacit knowledge to facilitate rapid decisions. Staff then work as a team 
to rapidly assimilate and interpret information drawn from observations of the patient’s 
body and from technical, biomedical monitoring data. The meaning of technical data is 
negotiated during staff interaction. This analysis was informed by a theory of `bodily’ and 
`technical’ trajectory alignment that was first developed from an ethnography of death and 
dying in intensive care units. The categorisation of cardiac arrest situations and trajectory 
alignment are the means by which staff achieve consensus decisions and determine the 
point at which an attempt should be withdrawn. This enables them to construct an 
acceptable death in highly challenging circumstances. 
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Introduction 
Approximately 25,000 to 30,000 cardiopulmonary resuscitations (CPRs) are attempted 
annually in the UK, usually in an emergency department (ED) (Boucher, 2010). 
In the ED, resuscitation attempts involve either patients who suffer cardiac arrest outside 
hospital and are brought in by emergency paramedics or critically ill patients arresting 
shortly after arrival. In each case, staff must rapidly decide whether to continue, begin or 
withdraw CPR—invariably with an incomplete patient history and limited clinical data 
(Boucher, 2010). Pre-existing ‘do not attempt resuscitation’ (DNAR) orders are often not 
readily available and there is little time to establish their validity and applicability even if 
present. Although providing a trial of CPR when prognosis is uncertain is good clinical 
practice (General Medical Council, 2013; Iserson, 2010), the Resuscitation Council (UK) 
(2015) highlights the importance of quickly identifying those patients for whom resuscitation 
is futile; this is often difficult. 
 
Survival statistics alone are of little value in assessing the best course of action for individual 
patients. Survival rates for cardiac arrest outside of hospital are around 1% to 8% 
(Resuscitation Council (UK), 2015; Clarke, Lyon, Short, Crookston, & Clegg 2014; Herlitz et al., 
2006) and fewer than 20% of patients arresting in hospital will survive to discharge 
(Stapleton, Ehlenbach, Deyo, & Curtis, 2014; Resuscitation Council (UK), 2011). Overall 
survival rates have not significantly changed for decades and are especially poor when 
associated with advanced chronic disease (British Medical Association (BMA), 2014; Gaieski, 
Abella, & Goyal, 2012). Factors associated with better outcomes include rapid response 
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times, early initiation of CPR, younger patient age, the presence of a ‘shockable’ cardiac 
rhythm, early defibrillation and Advanced Life Support (ALS) treatments and skilled post 
cardiac arrest care (Nolan, Hazinski, Aickin & Bhanji, et al., 2015; Hess & White, 2010).  
 
In decision making, when the conditions for using logical and rational approaches, such as 
statistical probabilities cannot be met, there may be recourse to a model that relies on 
heuristics; a strategy of decision making that ignores part of the available information but 
nonetheless allows decisions to be made quickly and accurately (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011). Heuristics decision strategies have particular characteristics, they are: simple; neither 
inherently good or bad; exploitive of learned human capacities and reflective of the way 
decisions are made naturally, in the environments at hand (Pieterse & de Vries, 2013). One 
form of heuristics uses the principle of less is more, i.e. where there is an inverse 
relationship between the level of accuracy and amount of information (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Heuristic decision making is a consequence of human experience gained 
over time within a particular context. The ability to view situations within their contexts and 
as a whole, by drawing on previous experiences, is a characteristic of expertise (Gillespie & 
Paterson, 2009; Polanyi, 1966). In ED practice, cardiac arrest demands rapid and complex 
decision making to be effected about the appropriate levels of intervention to be provided 
without detailed information about that particular patient. Repeated exposure to cardiac 
arrest situations is likely to lead to decision making approaches in which staff differentiate 
cardiac arrest situations using `less is more’ heuristics to combine explicit and tacit 
knowledge. This enables rapid intervention in the absence of complete information.  
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The complexity of decision making is revealed by existing research which shows that CPR 
attempts in the ED vary in length from very brief to prolonged (Bailey, Murphy, & Porock, 
2010; Chan, 2011; Larkin, 2002; Lockey & Hardern, 2001; Timmermans, 1999). A greater 
understanding of how practitioners use tacit knowledge may reveal how decision making 
occurs in resuscitation situations. This paper draws on data from an ethnographic study of 
health care professionals working in two EDs to examine how they use tacit knowledge to 
reach decisions to commence, continue or stop resuscitation.  
Background 
In their seminal ethnographies, Glaser and Strauss (1965, 1968) showed that health care 
staff develop ways of determining expected pathways—known as ‘trajectories’—for dying 
patients and that staff use a range of strategies to manage the inherent uncertainties 
associated with transitions between different trajectories. Dealing with uncertainty is part of 
the everyday work of health care professionals and represents the ‘messiness’ of clinical 
practice (Schon, 1983). Under the guise of evidence-based medicine, efforts have been made 
to devolve the uncertainty of clinical decision making to algorithms—logical and highly 
rational approaches that break decision making down into a series of interlinked steps. 
Algorithms for ALS management are published by the Resuscitation Council (UK) based on 
the recommendations of the International Liaison Committee on Resuscitation (Nolan, 
Hazinski, Aickin & Bhanji, et al., 2015). However, a long tradition of social research in health 
care has also shown the importance of ‘tacit’ or ‘gestalt’ knowledge in decision making.  
 
Tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit, scientific knowledge, is hidden; described by Polanyi 
(1966:4) as `we can know more than we can tell’. This type of knowledge is based on 
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acquired expertise or habitual practices that the expert practitioner may find difficult not 
only to articulate, but even to recognise at all; such knowledge becomes taken for granted, 
although often shared in a particular subculture (Insch, McIntyre, & Dawley, 2008; Spradley, 
1979). 
 
The use of tacit knowledge in a wide variety of health care settings has been explored. 
Beckstead, Pezzo, Beckie & Shahraki et al (2014) investigated disparities in physicians’ 
referral for cardiac rehabilitation. They found a systematic gender bias where women were 
judged less likely to benefit from referral but 1 in 3 physicians were unaware of their bias. In 
public health, Higgins, Strange, Scarr, & Pennock et al (2011) explored how practitioners use 
evidence in practice and found the lack of transferability of statistically based evidence to 
local communities meant that professional judgements were dependent on a mix of 
knowledge of the evidence based literature and tacit knowledge based on professional 
experiences and observations thus building cumulative and shared wisdom. In occupational 
therapy Metzler & Metz (2010) show how therapists synthesise research based evidence 
with experiential knowledge when exercising clinical judgement and that the high value 
placed on research knowledge may result in tacit knowledge being driven underground.  
 
Some insights into how tacit knowledge and habitual practices influence the management of 
resuscitation and non treatment decisions in the ED and other clinical care areas have been 
provided by a small body of ethnographic research (Chan, 2011; Bailey et al., 2011; Page & 
Komaromy, 2005; Seymour, 2000; Timmermans, 1999).  
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In the ED, Chan (2011) shows that the time available to make the transition from active 
intervention to end of life care in the ED is short and thus hard to manage for staff. Decision 
making depends on the perception and understanding of the clinician in an inherently 
stressful and fast paced situation. Habits and routines relating to the use of algorithmic 
principles can sometimes overshadow more subtle communication practices or disguise the 
ethical complexities of decision making. Past experiences are crucial in helping clinicians deal 
with such situations.  
 
Examining the everyday practices of emergency staff in the USA, Timmermans (1999) 
identifies four characteristic patterns or categories of cardiac arrest—‘legal’, ‘elite’, 
‘temporary stabilisation’ and ‘stabilisation’—that are tacitly assigned according to the 
circumstances of the arrest, the clinical viability of the patient’s recovery and perceptions of 
the social worth of the patient within the ED culture. The role of tacitly assigned social worth 
in the management of death in the ED is illustrated by Bailey et al. (2011) in a description of 
‘spectacular’ and ‘subtacular’ deaths. Spectacular deaths involve active resuscitation and are 
regarded as priorities by ED staff because they fit with the life-saving ethos of the ED. In 
contrast, the care needs of patients with ‘subtacular’ deaths, who are often older people 
with long term conditions, are relegated by staff to a lower level of priority. In a comparison 
of unexpected deaths following CPR in emergency care versus expected deaths occurring in 
care homes for older people in the UK, Page and Komaromy (2005) show how tacit 
expectations shape professional practice and reinforce both professional and team 
identities.  
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Seymour’s (2000) ethnography of death and dying in the intensive care unit- an area of fast 
paced clinical action with some similarities to the ED- shows how staff synthesise explicit and 
tacit knowledge to try to achieve alignment of two potentially divergent trajectories of 
dying: ‘technical dying’, based on evidence gleaned from bio-monitoring and the results of 
biomedical investigations and ‘bodily dying’ based on expertise acquired from prior 
experience of similar clinical situations. When intensive care staff successfully align these 
trajectories they are able to describe the process of withdrawing life support as ‘nature 
taking its course’. The present study examines the transferability of one the author’s insights 
into trajectory alignment since we anticipated it may be transferable to the ED and the 
resuscitation practices of emergency practitioners within the UK (Seymour, 2000). This 
notion informed the aims and objectives for this study with a particular focus on trying to 
understand how staff determine an appropriate point for resuscitative efforts to be 
withdrawn 
Methods 
Location and ethical concerns 
The study was undertaken in two EDs in the North of England, one a suburban unit (General: 
65,000 new patients annually) and the other serving a large metropolitan city (City: 110,000 
new patients annually). Research ethical committee approval was gained from the 
Derbyshire Research Ethics Committee (04/Q2401/70). As the patient would be 
incapacitated when observed, their consent could not be obtained, however the research 
did not alter treatment, confidentiality was assured and the potential benefits of 
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understanding decision making were acknowledged by the ethics committee. Access was 
negotiated with the relevant medical and nursing managers within the EDs concerned.  
Sampling, recruitment, data collection tools and analysis 
Initially, time within the General ED was used to gain the trust of staff and create a 
researcher presence as part of the team, albeit with a non clinical role. Given the emotive 
nature of resuscitation work, explaining the study aims to staff and obtaining consent was 
achieved over several months using a phased approach. This involved the use of a poster to 
publicise the aims of the research, providing information sheets and setting up pre-project 
meetings. However individual face-to-face contact was most effective, if considerably more 
time consuming; an essential step but meant that observation was restricted to the General 
ED. Separate information sheets and written consent was obtained for all interviews. 
 
The central staff-base proved to be the best place to observe daily tasks and be informed 
about possible resuscitations. Observation in the resuscitation area was undertaken by SB 
during day shifts over a two-year period of fieldwork (June 2005 to July 2007). Observational 
fieldwork was episodic, amounting to 350 hours over the data collection period. Decision 
making surrounding a convenience sample of 11 patients who had resuscitation decisions 
was observed with salient observational data recorded in detailed field notes.  
 
Complimenting observational data, thirty seven in-depth interviews were undertaken with a 
purposive sample of staff. In the General ED selection was based on their roles in association 
with the 11 resuscitation decisions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). These interviews 
involved the following staff: nursing (n = 13), medical (n = 12) and paramedic (n = 2). In the 
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City unit, only interviews were undertaken to corroborate findings revealed by data 
collection in the General unit. In the City ED, these were with nursing (n = 6) and medical 
(n = 4) staff. 
 
 Interviews explored the staff member’s involvement in resuscitations, how decisions were 
made and their thoughts and feelings about these. Interviews normally lasted about 30 
minutes or less so not to disrupt normal activity. Participants wanted to share their stories 
and none refused to be involved. Interviews were interactive in approach, i.e. the interview 
was a form of social interaction between SB and the interviewee, with the resultant data 
seen as a mutual production (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2002). Interviews were digitally 
recorded and transcribed. Data from observations, interviews and field notes collected in 
the General unit were amalgamated to construct qualitative case studies, each focused on a 
resuscitation decision to achieve ‘thick’ descriptions. `Thick’ description sees beyond surface 
meanings to identify unexplored social phenomena and propose new theoretical 
explanations, insights and understandings (Boyle, 1994). Interview data from the City unit 
were used to check the transferability of these thick descriptions.  
 
SB, a lecturer at the time, had worked in the General ED unit some years earlier as a nurse 
and resuscitation trainer and drew on previous clinical experiences reflexively throughout 
the study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). A diary and memos were used to aid achieving 
balance between `outsider’ and `insider’ perspectives (Morse, 1994). Emergent analytical 
issues were discussed with the ED staff and amongst the authors, as the desire was to seek, 
rather than impose structure (Spradley, 1979). 
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Findings 
During the study, decisions surrounding the use of resuscitation for eleven patients were 
used to construct `cases’. Seven patients arrived at the ED already in cardiac arrest. Of these, 
five were certified dead in the ambulance and received no further resuscitation. The 
remaining two patients were brought into the ED, but further resuscitation proved to be 
unsuccessful and their deaths were certified. Three further patients arrested shortly after 
arriving in the ED: two of these died following unsuccessful resuscitation attempts and the 
third was transferred to a High Dependency Unit (HDU) following treatment for a respiratory 
arrest and septic shock, although cardiac arrest occurred later, in the HDU. The last of the 
eleven patients had a DNAR order assigned in the ED but did not subsequently suffer a 
cardiac arrest and was transferred to an Emergency Medical Unit (EMU); an important 
inclusion as an example of pre-emptive decision making. 
 
Early observation and interviews revealed different patterns of activity: sometimes 
resuscitation was withheld altogether, sometimes it was started but withdrawn very quickly, 
and occasionally resuscitation was more protracted. As the study progressed, SB shared 
provisional ideas with staff about how to explain this variation. Over the course of a number 
of discussions a typology of categories was developed which staff greed reflected the rapid 
differentiations they perceived to apply to resuscitation situations and which they regarded 
as ‘capturing’ this aspect of their practice: 
• Arrested and died (A & D); 
• Arrested and will die (A & will D); 
• Arrested and may die; ( A & may D) and 
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• Arrested and should live (A & should L). 
Table 1 summarises the 11 study cases and their categorisation using this typology. 
(Pseudonyms are used). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arrested and died 
This category accounts for those patients who are resuscitated by paramedics in the 
prehospital setting, but do not receive continued resuscitation within the ED. In this group of 
patients, the ‘bodily’ signs of dying associated with cardiac arrest are present alongside 
limited but immediately overwhelming evidence that irreversible ‘technical’ dying has 
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occurred—a combination that enables staff to rapidly establish that further resuscitation is 
futile and certification of death is appropriate. 
 
The first patient observed, Mr Thomas, is used to illustrate this category. Mr Thomas, age 68, 
had collapsed in a cardiac rehabilitation unit. The paramedics commenced resuscitation and 
contacted the ED to warn of their imminent arrival. They provided the ED staff with essential 
‘technical’ information about the patient’s cardiac arrest rhythm, which was pulseless 
electrical activity (PEA); that is, a cardiac rhythm normally associated with a cardiac output 
was visible on the monitor, but no palpable pulse was present. A non shockable rhythm such 
as PEA with no reversible cause has poorer outcomes (Resuscitation Council (UK), 2015). The 
following exchange between the senior doctor, junior doctor and other ED staff as they 
awaited Mr Thomas’s arrival indicated that they already assumed that his condition was 
irreversible. 
Senior doctor B: They’ve been in PEA for 30 minutes, so we won’t be doing much. 
Staff nurse C (to senior doctor B): You’re doing airway; (to junior doctor A) you do 
drugs? I’ll do CPR. 
Senior doctor B: They’ve got access (intravenous) and had full drug protocol. 
Junior doctor A (to staff nurse C): Get a med student to do CPR. 
Staff nurse C: Oh lovely! 
(From field notes.) 
Mr Thomas was assessed in the ambulance outside the ED. SB accompanied the senior 
doctor, who decided to cease the resuscitation attempt following a discussion with the 
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paramedics and a quick physical examination of the patient. They revealed that Mr Thomas 
had suffered an acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) two years previously. During CPR 
the original arrest rhythm of ventricular fibrillation (VF) had converted to asytole (‘flatline’) 
and then PEA. (Ventricular fibrillation is a cardiac arrest rhythm in which the muscle fibres of 
the ventricles contract in an uncoordinated way and treatment is by electric shock—
defibrillation—which attempts to restore sinus rhythm and cardiac output). 
 
After returning to the ED, a discussion then took place between the senior doctor and his 
junior colleague. 
Senior doctor B (reviewing history with junior doctor A): Cardiac arrest in rehab, fine 
VF, shocked into asystole, CPR for 30 minutes. I certified him in the ambulance as he 
had been hypoxic and asystolic for over 30 minutes. 
Junior doctor A (to senior doctor B): Would you have brought him in if the relatives 
had been present? 
Senior doctor B (after a moment’s consideration): Probably. 
(From field notes.) 
The doctors learned later that the paramedics had given Mr Thomas seven cycles of the ALS 
treatment algorithm for asystole, with no response. In addition, the paramedics had been 
unable to intubate him (securing the airway by inserting a tube into the trachea) because of 
his short and broad neck; ventilation was attempted using a bag and mask, which had been 
of limited effectiveness. 
 
15 
 
This case illustrates how three features of Mr Thomas’s immediate resuscitation history 
permitted the senior doctor to determine that death had already occurred and enabled him 
to withdraw resuscitation readily: the length of time without a cardiac output; the type of 
cardiac arrest rhythm and the persistence of this arrest rhythm despite an appropriate trial 
of treatment. The doctor was able to apply his theoretical knowledge and, by also drawing 
on prior experience, he was able to categorise the patient appropriately, although this was 
not explicitly articulated. This tacit process of categorisation was based on the range of 
technical features which were most significant and sufficient for the senior doctor to confirm 
that the evidence for technical death was overwhelming. His duty then shifted towards 
physical examination of the patient to confirm that evidence for bodily death was also 
present. Auscultation (listening for sounds) of the lungs and heart indicated that cardio-
respiratory signs of life were absent and thus confirmation of bodily death was rapidly 
established. 
 
This provides an understanding of how experiential, tacit knowledge is used to guide a 
decision to withdraw resuscitation; by the process of aligning technical with bodily evidence 
of dying, death is constructed. In this patient, this is relatively straightforward and although 
not specifically alluded to, Mr Thomas’s age (68) was known to staff and is likely to have 
been an enabling factor. In addition, the discussion between the doctors indicates that 
resuscitation may have been continued in the ED if Mr Thomas’s relatives had been in 
attendance, which suggests that social circumstances are an integral part of decision making 
and may disrupt an otherwise straightforward alignment of technical with bodily dying 
trajectories. In the next category below, the significance of the person’s age and whether or 
not the person is perceived as ‘elderly’ is shown to be especially important. 
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Arrested and will die 
Most patients brought into the ED in cardiac arrest receive only a short period of 
resuscitation, with staff appearing to know at the outset that the patient will not survive. 
Undertaking a period of resuscitation enables staff to fulfil their sense of professional duty 
and permits the opportunity for information gathering. During this time, the interactional 
work between staff centres on how the presenting cardiac arrest rhythm may be interpreted 
in light of other circumstances, such as the patient’s age and any associated significant 
concomitant illness. This consideration of a combination of factors facilitates a rapid 
alignment of bodily with technical dying, so that staff can confirm that further action is futile 
and can withdraw the resuscitation attempt. 
 
The case of Mrs Craven demonstrates this category. Mrs Craven, age 87, had been found on 
the floor of her sheltered accommodation by her care supervisor, who had then called the 
ambulance. On arrival at the ED, Mrs Craven was semiconscious with profound right-sided 
weakness, hypertension (high blood pressure) and loss of all speech. She experienced a 
cardiac arrest as she was being transferred to the ED trolley. Her initial cardiac arrest rhythm 
was PEA, although some palpable output returned after chest compressions. Her cardiac 
rhythm then degenerated into asystole and two cycles of the ALS algorithm were followed. 
The initial conversation amongst the staff was recorded in SB’s field notes. 
Consultant M: Have we managed to get an output? She’s trying to breathe. 
Senior sister N: How old is she? 
Consultant M: She’s 87. 
An unknown voice: Last BP was 187/107 before she arrested. 
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Senior sister N: I think that’s PEA. 
Consultant M: Can you feel a femoral output? 
Senior sister N: It’s very weak. 
Consultant M: She’s had adrenaline. 
Senior sister N: How old? 
Paramedic LT: She’s 87. 
(From field notes.) 
SB noted that the monitor showed only occasional cardiac complexes, indicative of technical 
dying. Staff activity quickly became more controlled: the initial flurry subsided and one of 
the nurses left the resuscitation room after checking that all was in order. Throughout the 
incident, the attendant anaesthetist FR stood watching near consultant M and made no 
attempt to become actively involved. As noted above, Mrs Craven’s age was mentioned 
twice during the initial conversation. There then ensued a discussion amongst the staff 
about whether they should persist with the resuscitation attempt. Paramedic LT joined the 
discussion. 
Paramedic LT: We got the job at 10.50. 
Anaesthetist FR: That’s nearly an hour ago! 
Staff nurse O: Oh yes! But she arrested in the ED. 
Consultant M: How many cycles have we done? 
Senior sister N: That’s the second. 
Anaesthetist FR: She keeps stopping. 
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Consultant M: Shall we make a decision? 
(From field notes.) 
By now the complexes on the monitor were only occasional and no pulse could be felt by the 
staff nurse. Chest compression had ceased. The consultant had stopped ‘bagging’ the patient 
(using a device for artificial ventilation) and active resuscitation effectively ended. The 
resuscitation attempt had lasted about fifteen minutes. SB later discussed the brevity of this 
attempt with the senior sister who was the team leader during the resuscitation. 
SB: At what point did you feel that resuscitation was appropriate to stop? 
Senior sister N: At the point it did, really, because it was quite a short arrest. But I think 
the fact that she’d collapsed in an environment where all the equipment was there, and 
despite giving drugs and all the other advanced life support that we give, we weren’t in 
a rhythm that was potentially reversible. And that mixed with the rest of the picture 
made us believe that the arrest attempt was fairly futile. 
SB: With your lady, would you say that having two cycles was a short resuscitation? 
Senior sister N: Definitely, yeah. 
SB: And that was based on? 
Senior sister N: Presentation, where age again I would say had a big deciding factor in 
it. And the presenting rhythm, she was never in what we term a shockable rhythm. 
(From an interview with senior sister N (General).) 
The senior sister went on to explain the distinction between chronological old age and the 
state of being ‘elderly’ due to illness or extreme frailty. 
SB: Okay, might there be a difference between old and elderly? 
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Senior sister N: I suppose, yes, in that if somebody was old, they are by age old, 
whereas often somebody who is elderly is perceived to be somebody that’s got quite a 
lot of illness. Somebody that’s got a lot of, I don’t know, cardiac illness or has had a lot 
of strokes, I might perceive them as elderly despite them being fairly young in age. 
(From an interview with senior sister N (General).) 
Conversely, she went on to explain that chronological age would be ignored if serious illness 
was not concomitant. 
Senior sister N: Yes, so likewise we had a lady in a few weeks back now who was 90 
something, I can’t remember, 92, 93, who was normally fit and well, had been driving a 
car up until a couple of years ago, no medical history, very little medications and she’d 
suddenly collapsed and arrested. And rightly or wrongly so, I perceived that she had a 
chance of a better outcome. 
SB: So she was old, not elderly? 
Senior sister N: Yes. 
(From an interview with senior sister N (General).) 
In decision making, the reasons for locating Mrs Craven in the arrested and will die category 
revolved around how interactions amongst staff and perceptions of her age gave meaning to 
the associated clinical presentation, albeit tacitly and permitted this patient to be considered 
as ‘elderly’. Combining explicit knowledge, the `technical’ presentation, with perceptions of 
this patient as an ‘elderly’ person more readily facilitate the interpretation of biomedical 
data as evidence of technical dying and the tacit alignment of technical with bodily dying 
trajectories. This helps staff to quickly agree that the resuscitation attempt should be 
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withdrawn. However, other factors such as whether relatives are present and the need to 
promote team working may also be important. A short resuscitation attempt may be 
undertaken for many reasons, and the example presented cannot claim to be a 
representative picture. Sometimes assigning a patient to this category provides a holding 
strategy to help the team gain time to gather information and to satisfy a professional sense 
of duty to do everything possible. 
Arrested and may die 
Although most resuscitation attempts either cease on arrival or last no more than a few 
minutes within the ED (the categories of arrested and died and arrested and will die), some 
resuscitation attempts are more prolonged. Such attempts are typically observed when 
treatments elicit some response but a patient’s condition is unstable and unpredictable. In 
these cases, significantly more interactional work is required by the team to effect the 
alignment of the technical and bodily dying trajectories. This category will be illustrated by 
the case of Mrs Wilson, age 65, who had been seen by her doctor at home with ‘flu-like’ 
symptoms. The following day, she had been found by a care worker on the floor of her home 
in a collapsed state and transferred to the ED where she suffered two cardiac arrests. SB’s 
field notes captured the essential details. 
When I entered the resuscitation room, seven staff were around the trolley. As I 
arrived, so did the senior doctor for medicine (senior doctor M). 
Senior doctor M: Hi there! Is she brady? (Bradycardic: presenting a slow pulse rate.) 
Consultant U: She’s had 500. (She had 500 mcg atropine.) 
Senior doctor M: Any blood results? 
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Consultant U: We’ve got a potassium. 
(From field notes.) 
Mrs Wilson then experienced a PEA arrest and CPR commenced. 
Senior doctor M: What’s she got on the monitor? Has she an output? 
Consultant U: Yes! . . . She’s vomiting. Pop her on her side. How much fluid has she 
had? That’s four litres altogether. 
Senior doctor M: Can we have some obs (observations) on her? 
(From field notes.) 
The consultant was able to palpate a pulse; `bodily’ evidence indicative of life. An instant 
sense of relief was felt by the team, because survival of the patient now seemed possible. 
However, Mrs Wilson’s condition remained precarious and resuscitation with fluids and 
drugs continued for about thirty minutes. She then experienced another cardiac arrest, 
prompting recommencement of CPR. The medical staff rapidly began a case conference to 
review the situation. 
Senior doctor M: Draw a line and start again; it’s a new arrest. Shall we see if there’s a 
pulse? Thirty-three a minute! Shall we try a BP? It’s got to be sepsis or something. Shall 
we give her adrenaline in a big vein? She’s got flipped T waves in V3 (an abnormal ECG 
finding), urine OK, white cell count OK, potassium OK. 
(To anaesthetist RT): I can’t think of anything else. Can you? 
Anaesthetist RT: Check the pH again. Has she had a chest x-ray? 
Senior doctor M: Yes. 
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Anaesthetist RT: Oh! She’s got an output. 
At this point the anaesthetist signalled to the medical student to stop chest compressions, 
who then awaited further instructions from the more experienced medical staff. 
Senior doctor M: We shouldn’t give adrenaline if she’s got an output. Has it gone 
again? It’s inadequate so we’ll have to start again. (Indicates for the medical student 
to recommence chest compressions.) Can anyone think of anything else to add? 
Anaesthetist RT: The question is, should we use adrenaline if she gets an output? 
Senior doctor M: We’ve got another pH: it’s 6.8! We’re not going to get her back from 
that! 
Anaesthetist RT (palpates a femoral pulse): What shall we do? It’s still there. 
Senior doctor M: It’s fading. The volume is going. 
Anaesthetist RT: She’s running on neat adrenaline! 
Senior doctor M: She’s making our decision for us: her output is going. 
Anaesthetist RT: Shall we stop? 
Senior doctor M: I think we should. All in agreement? 
Anaesthetist RT: I’ve never seen an arrest at 6.8 get better. 
(From field notes.) 
Following a period of resuscitation lasting over thirty minutes, the attempt was withdrawn. 
For this patient, the tacit allocation to the category of arrested and may die was quickly 
achieved, as there were significant responses to treatment and the clinical outcome was 
uncertain. The dynamic situation required highly detailed technical evidence to confirm that 
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dying was transforming into death. However, participants were able to use experiential 
knowledge to focus on specific features; ignoring less relevant information to guide their 
decisions. Biomedical evidence was constantly compared to the bodily evidence of a 
palpable pulse that, to the surprise and concern of the team, persisted in spite of various 
data suggesting that technical dying was inevitable. Here, the trajectories of bodily dying and 
technical dying were misaligned and protracted staff interaction during a longer 
resuscitation attempt was required to effect alignment. 
Arrested and should live 
The arrested and should live category was not witnessed by SB during the period of 
observational fieldwork but was explored in interviews. In the adult patient, the tacit 
ascription to this rare category could be rapidly achieved with limited information; when 
cardiac arrest is seen as a treatable consequence of injury or an acute cardiac event in the 
absence of associated severe chronic illness. This category also accounts for cardiac arrest in 
childhood; effecting the alignment of technical and bodily dying trajectories becomes less 
important and the exceptional social value placed on children dictates extended 
resuscitation times. 
 
An experienced staff nurse identified that some patients ‘should’ live and that these were 
usually those who arrested in the ED and could be instantly defibrillated:  
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Staff nurse L: Yeah. He went unconscious, doctor was with him. Went unconscious. I 
was just getting morphine, and doctor shouted ‘Can I have some help please quick!’ So I 
went around and I looked on the monitor: VF arrest. Got the monitor on him anyway. 
So I just put some pads on and gave 200 joules and looked at the monitor, and he was 
back in sinus rhythm. And that was it, come up fighting. 
SB: Right, and what was said before then is, at that time, you still didn’t think he was 
going to die from that? 
Staff nurse L: Oh no, not at all. He was too well. 
(From an interview with staff nurse L (General).) 
A senior doctor indicated other clinical, ‘technical’ circumstances when survival was also 
more likely: 
Senior doctor AJ: Yes, and in general those patients may be for example immediately 
post-MI (myocardial infarction). So some, a patient has come in with something which 
is acute in onset, so it’s not a terminal event like airways disease or a terminal event of 
another chronic illness. But it’s, ah, of course they may have assumed heart disease and 
an MI in that sense is eventually, on a continuum. But if they have a sudden acute 
treatable event, such as MI, and then they arrest, then yes they are alive and should 
live. 
SB: Okay, but is that rare or common would you say? 
Senior doctor AJ: No, that’s rare. 
(From an interview with senior doctor AJ (General).) 
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The ‘technical’ evidence of short duration VF should be reversible—a trajectory suggestive of 
living. However, survival is never certain and in all arrests a degree of pessimism is almost a 
prerequisite. 
 
Importantly, a senior sister confirmed that within the arrested and should live category, it 
was expected that resuscitation would continue for a longer time. She introduced the issue 
of age, particularly when dealing with ‘young’ adults. 
Senior sister DB: It would go on, again. The story that we were given when the patient 
first came in, and without being awful but, and age does come into it. Because if you’ve 
got like a young person who’s taken an overdose that you find out, you would definitely 
continue their resuscitation for a lot longer. Or somebody who was cold. . . . Like if 
somebody had just had a VF arrest who was 35, I would continue for 40 minutes plus if 
we were getting anything back. Or I would expect because it’s not for my decision as 
such, it’s a joint decision with the other team members, but in those circumstances I 
would expect to continue longer. 
The sister further considered how the length of resuscitation attempts may be affected if it 
was being performed on a child. 
Senior sister DB: Well, from experience, we had a paediatric come in on my shift, and I 
went into the resuscitation, who had drowned, so the resuscitation went on for about 
an hour and 20 minutes. Now, for an elderly chap, like we had today, who had already 
been down for 25 minutes with no output, et cetera, the chances of him surviving 
against the chances of the child surviving, the chance of the child surviving were still 
quite good in my experience, yes. 
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(From an interview with senior sister DB (General).) 
Participant’s identified that the way they categorised children was different from that of the 
adult. They were much more likely to locate a child within the category of arrested and 
should live, even if their knowledge and understanding of the clinical evidence suggested 
that survival was not feasible and thus a decision was often made to continue resuscitation: 
Consultant Y: No, they should live basically, I would say. Unless they’ve been down for 
a long time in a rhythm that is, I think, to me, it’s not about age to start with it’s about 
the history, what the rhythm is and how long they’ve been down. Those are probably, 
because even if it’s a child, and they’ve been down for an hour, I know that child’s 
going to die. 
SB: Right. So your expectation would still be the same? 
Consultant Y: It would be the same, yes. But I think sometimes you continue, in a 
younger person you might continue resuscitation longer. My expectation is the same, 
but everybody else’s might not be. And the family’s might not be. And so you might 
carry on resuscitation a bit longer, until expectation is realistic. 
(From an interview with consultant Y (General).) 
Participants identified those technical features that experience had enabled them to  
associate with the category of arrested and should live; reserved for those adults with a 
shockable rhythm as a consequence of an acute condition rather than a severe chronic 
illness. However, in the context of the ‘younger’ adult or paediatric cardiac arrest, decision 
making is driven by a complex admixture of factors that represent the desire to save life at 
all cost. In these cases, irrefutable evidence of technical and bodily dying may be outweighed 
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by the perceived social worth of the ‘younger’ adult or child, leading ED staff to continue 
resuscitation for extended periods of time. 
Discussion 
In exploring resuscitation decision making by ED staff, analysis of the data was undertaken in 
collaboration with participants, to reveal a perceptual map or typology of tacitly allocated 
resuscitation categories: arrested and died; arrested and will die; arrested and may die; and 
arrested and should live. This is an example of how tacitly acquired experiential knowledge 
enables practitioners to place complex resuscitation situations within a structure that 
facilitates their rapid decision making. We investigated how interactions amongst ED staff 
are influenced by this typology, applying the notion of trajectory alignment first developed 
in the context of end-of-life decision making in intensive care units (Seymour, 2000). Whilst 
the alignment of technical and bodily dying trajectories becomes progressively more 
problematic across the categories, we have shown that in the ED, as in intensive care units, 
that staff work is directed at the synthesis of explicit and tacit evidence from a variety of 
technical monitoring and bodily observational sources to enable trajectory alignment and is 
the means both by which further intervention is established as futile and an appropriate 
death is constructed. The degree of difficulty staff experience in aligning technical and bodily 
trajectories reflected the category within which they allocated the particular resuscitation 
situation at hand and determined the length of the resuscitation attempt. For example, in 
the arrested and died category (typically involving an unaccompanied ‘elderly’ adult patient 
whose cardiac rhythm showed prolonged PEA or asystole), alignment of the trajectories was 
straightforward. When chronic and terminal illnesses exist, these are associated with much 
poorer outcomes (Stapleton et al., 2014: Cadogen, 2010) and persistent asystole for over 
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twenty minutes despite ongoing ALS, in the absence of a reversible cause is considered 
reasonable grounds to stop resuscitation (Resuscitation Council (UK), 2015). These 
`subtacular’ deaths were not preventable by the application of advanced medical technology 
and as noted by Bailey et al (2011), do not fit with the ethos of emergency care. Thus it is 
possible to quickly establish the attempt as futile. 
 
In contrast, the most troublesome process of alignment occurred in the arrested and should 
live category where long resuscitation attempts occurred. Longer resuscitative efforts for 
some patients do have an empirical evidence base and explicit clinical justification if specific 
circumstances exist. In children, the cause of arrest is usually hypoxemia and hypotension 
and prolonged resuscitation may be successful (National Confidential Enquiry into Patient 
Outcome and Death, 2009). In adults, survival after a prolonged attempt may be achieved 
where primary myocardial ischaemia is the cause of the arrest, VF is present on the monitor 
and the arrest witnessed allowing delivery of immediate defibrillation (Resuscitation Council 
(UK), 2011; Hess & White, 2010; Walker, 2008). These `technical’ elements often only 
become clear `post-hoc’; staff in ED must therefore apply tacit knowledge to determine the 
most appropriate categorisation of any adult cardiac arrest situation before they are in 
possession of this level of detail. 
 
In the context of end of life caring practices in the ED, Timmermans (2005) contends that 
resuscitation also takes on a significant role as a social ritual in the creation of an acceptable 
and culturally appropriate death. Resuscitation acts as a rite of passage, softening the 
abruptness of sudden death (Tercier, 2005). The ability to integrate social circumstances into 
decision making is an essential component of tacit knowledge and significantly impacts on 
29 
 
resuscitation practices. For example, if relatives are present, the status of the patient as a 
social being becomes a key factor in continuing resuscitation and may drive a public display; 
a `spectacular’ death requires that everything is seen to be done and allows time for 
relatives to come to terms with the difficult process of dying (Bailey et al., 2011; 
Timmermans, 1999). This may overrule `technical’ and `bodily’ definitions of death even 
when it is considered that these dying trajectories are aligned, resulting in a continuation of 
the resuscitation attempt. Chan (2005) has shown how end of life care practices in the ED, 
are shaped by societal expectations and shared with other practitioners (praxis) but also 
refined by individual experiences and knowledge that becomes embedded in practice 
(phronesis); reinforcing the value of tacit knowledge to decision making. 
 
In decision making about the continuation and withdrawal of resuscitative efforts we have 
illustrated how the tacit ascription to a resuscitation category and subsequent interactional 
work to align dying trajectories is based on the rapid assimilation of details about the length 
of the arrest, the arrest rhythm, response to treatments and other factors such as 
perceptions of `elderly’. In the ED, we propose that the ascription of patients to tacitly 
applied resuscitation categories draws on heuristics to create a fast and frugal decision-
making tree (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) constructed through experience. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that ED staff’s decisions regarding the use of resuscitation 
involve the tacit ascription of resuscitation situations to four resuscitation categories. The 
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application of categories is indicative of how skilled practitioners develop strategies to cope 
with the moral uncertainties of balancing intervention and withdrawal of treatment in 
critical life-and-death situations. These categories are constructed rapidly for each patient 
using ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic decision-making approaches that enable staff to ignore less 
important information, focus on the combination of ‘technical’ and ‘bodily’ information 
indicative of dying and take into account the social context.  
 
Decision making in complex situations draws on various sources of information. Specialist, 
explicit knowledge is applied through the conduit of tacit know-how. Tacit knowledge is 
accrued though experience and is not easily codified or expressed. However, tacit know-how 
is an essential part of professional practice and should be revealed and valued. The lack of 
debate regarding the nature of tacit knowledge may result in discrepancies in behaviour, as 
personal biases remain concealed and unchallenged. An over emphasis on research based 
knowledge may devalue expertise and the experiential tacit knowledge that often underpins 
clinical judgement; judgement based on the ability to combine sources of knowledge to 
produce the cumulative wisdom necessary for its practical application.     
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